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Models now play a dominant role in
contemporary science, where they 
form the bulk of scientifi c output,
the development of which has been
precipitated by the massive infl ux of 
computers into virtually all scienti-
fi c disciplines. Cutting-edge fi elds,
such as genetics or particle physics,
in particular would be unthinkable
without the large-scale deployment
of computers, which crunch big
experimental data and allow resear-
chers to validate or construct new 
models.
Models also entered the popular
imagination when they were blamed
for their part in triggering the 2008
fi nancial crisis1 – or, more precisely, 
it was the hubris of economic mod-
elers (alas oft en coming to econom-
1 An honest refl ection on modeling pun-
ditry gone wrong is given, for example, in
Emanuel Derman, Models. Behaving. Badly:
Why Confusing Illusion with Reality Can
Lead to Disaster on Wall Street and in Life
(New York: Free Press, 2011).
ics from the natural sciences), who 
created the fl awed depictions of 
economic reality and exaggerated 
the predictive powers of their petty 
creations.
But the dalliance between 
models and science is much older 
than that and goes back to the time-
honored experiments of Galileo and 
even earlier. It is thus no wonder 
that philosophy of science has been 
refl ecting upon the subject mat-
ter. Since the foundational work of 
Tarski2 in the 1930s and then the 
revived interest spurred by Seman-
tic View adherents, the attention to 
models has been steadily growing in 
the past decades, when fundamental 
contributions to their understand-
ing have been made.
Th e volume under review was 
published as the 25th book in the 
SAPERE series in which books on 
models are regularly issued,3 such as 
the recent comprehensive Handbook
of Model-Based Science,4 which off ers 
a  number of theoretical contribu-
tions together with detailed accounts 
2 Alfred Tarski, “Th e Concept of Truth in
Formalized Languages,” in Logic, Semantics,
Metamathematics; Papers from 1923 to 1938
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 
152–278.
3 Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology 
and Rational Ethics, which aims to present
works at the crossroads of philosophy and 
scientifi c and technological disciplines.
4  Lorenzo Magnani and Tommaso Bertolotti,
eds. Handbook of Model-Based Science
(Cham: Springer, 2017).
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of the multitudes of uses of models
and simulations in the sciences.
Similar collections from other pub-
lishers include Models, Simulations,
and Representations,5 or the older, 
now classical title such as Models as 
Mediators: Perspectives on Natural 
and Social Science6 and numerous 
other books by individual authors.
Models and Inferences in Science
provides a  panoramic view of the
topic, in which both theoretical and
practical chapters give a glance into
the world of scientifi c modeling.
Apart from this main focus, there is
no central theme to the volume, so it
contains rather loosely related con-
tributions addressing various issues
about modeling, including the roles
models assume in mathematics, bi-
ology, astronomy, physics, and psy-
chiatry or such practical disciplines
as petroleum engineering.
As the editors, Emiliano Ip-
politi, Fabio Sterpetti and Th omas
Nickles, astutely remark in the
opening chapter “Modeling and
Inferring in Science” (1–9) models
come in all shapes and sizes and
cannot be conveniently covered by 
a single defi nition, and this volume
attests to that fully – in contempo-
5 Paul Humphreys and Cyrille Imbert, eds.
Models, Simulations, and Representations
(New York: Routledge, 2011).
6 Margaret Morrison and Mary Morgan, eds.
Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural 
and Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999).
rary science, models range from 
inanimate physical objects through 
sets of mathematical equations to 
living beings (e.g. mice in medicine). 
Th is variety makes it diffi  cult to at-
tain any unifying defi nition of the 
concept, and the same holds true for 
the philosophical underpinnings of 
the models. Philosophers of science 
have not reached any agreement 
as to the nature of models, so they 
can, for example, be conceived in 
an instrumental sense as heuristical 
devices, or in a  model-theoretical 
sense as vehicles in the search of true 
scientifi c knowledge, or in any other 
sense. As a result, any attempt to ex-
actly pinpoint the concept of model 
or to appropriate it for a particular 
use invites objections from oppos-
ing philosophical camps. Th is leads 
the editors to the rather skeptical 
conclusion that some of these diff er-
ences simply create unsurmountable 
obstacles – for example the Received 
View is clearly not compatible with 
the Semantic View, and so they can 
never be reconciled.
Sorin Bangu in his chapter “On 
‘Th e Unreasonable Eff ectiveness 
of Mathematics in the Natural Sci-
ences’” (11–29) ponders the question 
originally spelled out by physicist 
Eugen Wigner almost 60 years ago,7
7 Eugene Wigner, “Th e Unreasonable
Eff ectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural 
Sciences,” Communications in Pure and 
Applied Mathematics 13, no. 1 (1960): 1–14.
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which eventually gave rise to an ava-
lanche of responses from scientists
and philosophers big and small. If 
we sum up Wigner’s original thesis
into several simple maxims, they 
would go like this: Th e fi rst mys-
tery is the role that mathematics
plays in the natural sciences, which
also quite naturally engenders the
contention that the laws of nature
are formulated in mathematical
language. And equally mysterious
is the capacity of the human mind
to discover (“divine”) these laws.
Before opening his own polemics
with Wigner, Bangu enumerates
six main objections to Wigner’s
article by his opponents. Unlike
Wigner, the critical voices fi nd the
alliance of mathematics and natural
sciences quite natural – from the
view that this happy accident can
be attributed to chance, through the
view that physical systems presup-
pose modeling, which makes them
fi t for mathematical treatment, to
the opinion that our mathematical
sense is an evolutionary tool. Bangu
recaps the discussion, laying out ar-
guments both for and against Wign-
er’s thesis, with multiple digressions
to related topics such as the history 
of mathematics, its divine/human
nature, the anthropic principle, and
even intelligent design. To illustrate
his own objection, Bangu intro-
duces a fi ctional physicist Neinstein
who presented his theory of General
Th eory of Relativity before the
necessary mathematical apparatus 
(Riemannian geometry) was in 
place, and then raises a crucial ques-
tion: Would such a theory (or, better 
said, vision, since without the math-
ematical formalism, we can hardly 
call it a  theory) be taken seriously? 
Bangu’s answer is a  resolute no,8
and he uses this line of argument to 
do away with Wigner’s thesis: there 
is no miracle in operation here and 
everything can be explained by the 
normal workings of the scientifi c 
environment, which leads him to 
the conclusion that “Wigner’s riddle 
can be (dis)solved.”
Scientifi c decisions almost al-
ways seem rational – in retrospect. 
Science, once considered a  prime 
example of rationality, lost some 
of its gilding aft er the peculiarities 
of scientifi c decision making have 
been brought to light in the works 
of Simon, Kuhn, Gigerenzer and 
others, who have pointed to various 
kinds of non-rationalities that are 
deeply moored in scientifi c think-
ing. In “Fast and Frugal Heuristics 
at Research Frontiers” (31–54) 
Th omas Nickles explores the po-
tential of fast and frugal heuristics 
(f&f), fi rst proposed by Gigerenzer 
8 Here we can disagree, this conclusion is
perhaps valid for some theories, but is not 
universal. Many theories in physics were 
at fi rst expressed only in qualitative terms 
(e.  g., electricity) before being formalized 
into mathematical language.
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and his colleagues9 in the context of 
frontier research characterized by 
sparse and badly organized domain
knowledge, where decision-making
is oft en done under extreme uncer-
tainty. Despite the fact that in fron-
tier research a  lack of information
typically occurs, Nickles astutely 
observes that the current diffi  culty 
in science is exactly the opposite –
there is too much information, such
as articles, experimental data etc.
– the situation he calls the knowl-
edge pollution problem. He then
probes the possibility of applying
some practical recommendations
and “rules of thumb” to facilitate
research – but reports mixed results.
Fabio Sterpetti devotes his
chapter “Scientifi c Realism, the
Semantic View and Evolutionary 
Biology” (55–76) to the appraisal
of the suitability of applying the
Ontic Structural Realism (OSR)
framework to population biology.
Th e specifi c link between this par-
ticular branch of Structural Real-
ism, compounded with Semantic
View, and mathematical models in
population genetics was established
by Steven French in Th e Structure
of the World.10 Sterpetti, neverthe-
less, challenges this view and levels
9 Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd, and the
ABC Research Group, Simple Heuristics
Th at Make Us Smart (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999).
10  Steven French, Th e Structure of the World 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
a good amount of criticism against 
Frenche’s proposal. Th e central issue 
here is the relation of models and 
mathematics to the world: lumping 
together Structural Realism with 
the Semantic View, he maintains, 
imminently leads to the conception 
that physical reality is understood 
in terms of mathematical struc-
tures, although this view is beset 
with a number of problems such as 
the collapse problem.11 Th e fi rst at-
tempts to apply the Semantic View 
to biological theories dates back to 
the 80s, when this approach seemed 
more appropriate for biology than 
the Syntactic View (Received 
View) with its requirements for 
axiomatized theory. Th e choice of 
evolutionary biology was also not 
random, because this fi eld belongs 
to the most formalized in biology. 
But the Semantic View in biol-
ogy is vulnerable too, as Sterpetti 
warns. He reiterates some points of 
contention, among them that the 
current formulation of population 
genetics is not adequate, because 
models in population genetics are 
mostly of a  statistical nature and 
provide mere descriptions without 
capturing causal links or providing 
explanations and predictions. In ad-
11  Th e assumption of a relation between the 
world and theories implies that the (physi-
cal) world is also a  mathematical structure 
– a dubious proposition that is by no means 
universally shared by current philosophers 
of science.
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dition, as he also points out, models
(theories) in biology are much more
complicated than in physics, as are
the phenomena they describe. Based
on these arguments, he concludes
that Frenche’s proposal to adopt
OSR in biology doesn’t bring any 
desired advantage over previous
eff orts.
Emily Grosholz in her con-
tribution “Models of the Skies“
(77–94) takes the reader on a  tour
of historical models of the sky (the
solar system, our galaxy and the
cosmos in general). Along the way,
Groszholz discusses several general
topics such as ampliative reasoning
and the referential versus analyti-
cal purpose of models. Th e journey 
begins with Brahe’s Rudolphine
Tables and Kepler’s laws of motion,
and continues through Galileo’s
observations of the sky, Newton’s
revolutionary contributions, and
19th century achievements, to the
apex of modern astronomy with its
currently hotly debated topic – the
unexplained phenomenon of ga-
lactic movements, which currently 
divides the community of physicists 
and astronomers. Th e stakes are
high, since the deep discord between
measurements and theory calls ei-
ther for the revision of fundamental
gravitational laws (e.g. the MOND
theory), or the introduction of “dark 
matter” into the picture, a sort of ad 
hoc theory which makes the data fi t
the observation. From this case, the
takeaway – although not expressed 
explicitly by Groszholz – is that no 
matter how reliable the theories or 
models we develop are and how well 
they match the existing data there is 
always the possibility of a discovery 
that threatens to upend established 
physical knowledge.
Carlo Cellucci in his “Models 
of Science and Models in Science” 
(95–112) postulates an important 
distinction between models of 
science and models in science, the
former denoting models of scientifi c 
activity, the latter models that are 
used in individual sciences (for ex-
ample, those used in biology, phys-
ics or other sciences). He recognizes 
four individual models of science: 
the analytic-synthetic model (Aris-
totle’s), the hypothetico-deductive 
model (Carnap’s and others), the se-
mantic model (van Fraassen’s), and 
the analytic model (Pólya’s). With-
out going into much detail, Cellucci 
sketches the distinctive features of 
these models and how they general-
ize the functioning of science, and 
discusses their relation to models 
in science, i.e. how they account for 
models used in various sciences. 
From the models of science, Cel-
lucci selected the analytical model 
as the one which best accounts for 
both theory formation and theory 
change. Th anks to its unique fea-
tures, he maintains, the analytical 
model is highly congruent with one 
of the essential characteristic of sci-
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ence – the potentially infi nite quest
for more general theories. However,
in my opinion, this suggested pri-
macy is disputable, because there
are also other alternative models
that account for scientifi c changes
(i.e. Kuhn’s, Laudan’s, Hull’s, Giere’s
etc.) and it is not quite clear why this
particular model favored by Cellucci
should come ahead of the others.
Even if Cellucci’s descriptions of the
individual models of science are too 
brief and simplifying, he inadvert-
ently brings up an important ques-
tion – how is it possible that up to
now, the philosophy of science has
not reached a  consensus regarding
the model of science of how science
works?
Th e use of models to explain
various kinds of disorders has
become a  common occurrence in
the life sciences and medicine –
and psychiatry is no exception. In
“Mechanistic Models and Modeling
Disorders” (113–32) Raff aella Cam-
paner takes the example of ADHD
(Attention Defi cit Hyperactivity 
Disorder) which she approaches
with a mechanistic and “neo-mech-
anistic” framework. Simply put,
the mechanistic framework takes
mechanism as the basis from which
behavior is explained, in which the
mechanism is an organized system
of interacting parts that perform
certain activities. Th e important
feature of these models is the knowl-
edge of the underlying mechanism
that produces a  given behavior, so 
they shouldn’t be understood only 
as “black-box” types of models. 
Typically, in neuropsychiatric mod-
els, in addition to biological factors 
we encounter all sorts of other in-
teractions, for example cultural and 
social, which take on an explanatory 
role. Th at said, it is obvious that 
these models are complex networks 
of causal mechanisms, rather than 
simple causal links, because psychi-
atric disorders tend to be “messy”, 
meaning that their causes are still 
poorly understood by contemporary 
science. Th is is the case of ADHD12
too, for which the etiology is still 
only vaguely determined, with both 
genetic and environmental factors 
at play. Camparer discusses two 
theoretical models of ADHD – the 
executive dysfunction model, and 
the motivational model – positing 
a single underlying neurobiological 
mechanism, which provides some 
explanation. However, these models 
do not exhaust the whole spectrum 
of possible mechanisms and a com-
bined “multiple pathway” model (in 
addition to other models) has been 
suggested. Camparer remarks on 
an interesting aspect of this. When 
model builders try to incorporate 
factors other than biological (higher 
12  ADHD is defi ned as “a persistent pattern
of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impul-
sivity that interferes with development” 
(DSM V classifi cation).
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level factors such as cultural, psy-
chological and social) to unravel the
causes, they are forced to model var-
ious other interdependencies, which
makes the overall system even more
comprehensive. As a  result, they 
also end up with a diff erent concep-
tion of the disorder itself.
Th e discovery of deterministic
chaos, known by the general public
as the popular butterfl y eff ect, has
had a  wide-range impact on the
philosophy of science as well. Chaos
theory states that a small change in
the initial conditions of a determin-
istic system can cause far-reaching
eff ects. Th is was perceived by some
as a  lethal blow to the hardline
determinism of the Laplacian kind.
Sergio Caprara and Angelo Vulpiani
in “Chaos and Stochastic Models in
Physics: Ontic and Epistemic As-
pects” (133–46) try to clarify some
common misconceptions about
determinism, predictability and
related concepts such as reduction-
ism, mechanicism, stochasticity 
and causality. Th ey make an eff ort
to emphasize that the concepts of 
determinism and predictability 
especially should be clearly dis-
tinguished and that the former
doesn’t imply the latter. In doing
so, they correct some widely circu-
lated errors, for instance Popper’s
statements about determinism and
prediction, which Popper confuses.
Aft er this introduction, they 
focus on the ontic and epistemic
character of chaos: in their view, 
determinism is an ontic concept, 
whereas predictability refers to our 
knowledge of the system and is 
therefore epistemic; chaos stands 
between the two because it exhibits 
both ontic and epistemic aspects.
Emiliano Ippoliti in “Ways of 
Advancing Knowledge. A  Lesson 
from Knot Th eory and Topology”
(147–72) takes on the long-standing 
problem of how mathematical prob-
lems are posed, treated and solved 
and how this is related to ampliative 
reasoning and the nature of math-
ematical objects. His fi rst example 
are knots:13 the fi rst attempts at the
classifi cation of knots date back to 
19th century, when it was suggested
that they could lay the mathemati-
cal foundation to Lord Kelvin’s 
vortex theory of the atom.14 More 
attempts at fi nding an appropriate 
approach to their representation fol-
lowed (graph theory etc.). However, 
a new impulse for the theory came 
when the connection between knot 
theory and braid theory was estab-
lished, in which knots have braid 
representation. Th is move made it 
possible to study them with algebra 
(group theory), which opened new 
vistas for the whole fi eld. In the 
second example, Ippoliti shows how 
13  A mathematical knot is a closed non-self-
-intersecting curve in three dimensions.
14  Th ey made a comeback in the 20th century 
physics (quantum theory).
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topological objects – 3-manifolds,
can be studied with algebraic tools
aft er they have been associated with
algebraic structures.
Th ese above-mentioned in-
stances serve Ippoliti as model cases
that underscore the unique role that
representation of objects in math-
ematics assumes. Mathematicians
oft en make a great eff ort to link one
object to another, already existing
object, so that the connection can
be utilized for the advancement of 
knowledge. In this process, math-
ematicians employ a number of heu-
ristics for conceptualization, repre-
sentations and manipulations with
mathematical objects. However,
the choice of representation singles
out some features of the objects and
suppresses others, to the eff ect that
these unique representations reveal
diff erent properties. One can im-
mediately perceive how this process
is related to modeling in general.
Th e objects studied are “enriched”
step-by-step with new information,
new knowledge is generated and
some puzzles are solved, but new 
problems usually arise too. Th e bot-
tom line here, according to Ippoliti,
is that a  “mathematical object is
simply a  hypothesis put forward to
solve a  given problem which can
always be conceptualized in new 
ways” (168). In addition, this process
is historic, that is, codetermined by 
the state of the existing knowledge,
and holistic, that is, dependent on,
but also infl uencing, knowledge 
in other fi elds. Hence, even math-
ematical knowledge is dynamic 
and not static, as it is sometimes 
presented.
For decades, theories have been 
a  fi xture in the scientifi c realism 
debate, but the entry of models into 
the natural and social sciences has 
somewhat shift ed interest in favor 
of models. Unlike theories, we oft en 
work with multiple models of the 
same phenomenon because they 
highlight its distinctive features, 
which makes analysis even more 
complicated from the realist point 
of view. In his contribution “Mod-
els, Idealisations, and Realism” 
(173–89) Juha Saatsi examines the 
ramifi cations of this proposition. 
Idealized depictions of various phe-
nomena (frictionless planes, point 
masses, isolated systems, and om-
niscient agents etc.) are hallmarks 
of the scientifi c approach, however, 
no one should be surprised that this 
approach comes at a  price, since 
the way in which science interacts 
with idealizations can be always 
brought into question. As Saatsi 
explains, there are several answers 
to this challenge: idealizations can 
be considered as “simplifying sup-
positions”, or approached from the 
semantic point of view, or adapted 
for the realist framework – the job 
that Saatsi himself undertakes in 
his article. Aft er his exposition of 
the topic, he deals with the issues of 
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the falsity/veracity of models, their
predictive success, the way in which
models exactly models latch onto
the reality and how they relate to
scientifi c explanations.
In “Modelling Non-empirical
Confi rmation” (191–205) Richard
Dawid correctly observes that many 
times the conditions for empirical
confi rmation of theories are not
ideal and face many challenges – for
instance, in anthropology (or other
historical disciplines), in which sci-
entists typically base their (dis)con-
fi rmation of theories only on patchy 
evidence as a result of missing data,
or in physics, where scientist rely in
their reasoning on some unobserv-
able entities (as is the recent case
of Higgs boson), or they work on
theories such as string theory or
cosmological theories which lack 
even a speck of empirical confi rma-
tion (and such confi rmation may 
not even be available in the future).
Consequently, in such cases, the de-
cision about a  particular empirical
confi rmation is important for the
theoretical framework as a  whole.
However, the issues related to these
decisions have more than once
caused a  good deal of controversy 
within the scientifi c community.
Non-empirical confi rmation, which
Dawid understands as an extension
of empirical confi rmation, thus
amounts to observations about the
research context of the theory. In his
article, Dawid embarks on a mission
to formalize this non-empirical 
theory confi rmation within the 
Bayesian framework, with the help 
of the example of the empirical 
confi rmation of the Higgs particle. 
However, in my view, the execu-
tion of such a  plan can easily run 
into diffi  culties and we have to ask 
how viable such proposals are for 
formalization when “confi rmation 
situations” in science typically vary 
in many, oft en unrelated, aspects? 
Unfortunately, we can hardly expect 
that any kind of a formalized model 
can account for all the vagaries of 
the confi rmation process in real-life 
science.
“What is mathematics?” asks 
Reuben Hersh in “Mathematics as 
an Empirical Phenomenon, Subject 
to Modeling?” (207–18). Th e well-
known author15 then presents his 
answer in a fast-paced text devoid of 
the usual philosophical lingo. So far, 
mathematics, be it content or activ-
ity, has been analyzed separately by 
logicians, historians, psychologists, 
philosophers, neuroscientists and 
others, with each of these disci-
plines contributing its own model of 
the subject. But what the “modeling 
business” teaches us in general is 
that these models only select out 
some properties of the modeled phe-
nomenon and they never encompass 
15 Hersh is the award winning author and 
co-author of popularizing books on mathe-
matics.
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its entirety. As far as mathematical
content is concerned, here, too,
philosophers have suggested various
competing “positions” or theories,
such as nominalism, intuitionism,
logicism etc. – but if we regard them
as models, each of which captures
selected features, the idea of plural-
ity suddenly seems quite natural.
Th us Reuben Hersh falls into the
liberal category of philosophers
and advocates an overall “ecumeni-
cal” approach, in which models are
considered mutually non-exclusive
alternatives under the aegis of uni-
fi ed mathematics studies.
Lorenzo Magnani in “Scientifi c
Models Are Distributed and Never
Abstract: A  Naturalistic Perspec-
tive” (219–40) constructs his critical
stance towards factionalism in the
philosophical debate on the nature
of the scientifi c model with the
support of cognitive science, which
allegedly reveals inadequacies in the
concept of models as abstractions
or idealizations. Th e gist of Mag-
nani’s argument revolves around
the idea that scientifi c models are
indispensable tools in the rational
and empirical process of scientifi c
discovery and therefore cannot be
fi ctional. In other words, models are
also weapons in what Magnani calls
“epistemic warfare” with nature (tar-
get systems, the structure of which
they should uncover). And not only 
that, the fi ctional account of models
obfuscates the distinction between
various domains such as science, 
religion and the arts, which should 
have clear-cut boundaries. As much 
as it is bolstered by argumentative 
terminology, I  feel that Magnani’s 
objections fail to provide enough of 
the evidence which should lead us 
to discard the fi ctional account of 
scientifi c models (in which he also 
includes all the concepts of models 
as “surrogates”, “credible worlds”, 
“missing systems”, “make-believe” 
and the like). On the contrary, there 
is obviously a  strong affi  liation be-
tween scientifi c and literary fi ctions 
as idealization.16 Scientifi c models 
and literary fi ctions share a  great 
many characteristics, and a study of 
their deeper connections can yield 
signifi cant knowledge, although 
there are, of course, obvious diff er-
ences that shouldn’t be downplayed: 
it is true, for example, that models 
and literary characters vary ac-
cording to their use. But Magnani’s 
sweeping critique doesn’t seem to 
be well founded enough to dismiss 
the whole business of models as 
fi ctions.
Petroleum engineering emerged 
as a  relatively new fi eld in Earth 
and Mineral Sciences. Kahindo 
Kamau and Emily Grosholz in the 
fi nal chapter “Th e Use of Models 
in Petroleum and Natural Gas 
16  As outlined for instance in Roman Frigg 
“Models and Fiction,” Synthese 172, no. 2 
(2010): 251–68. 
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Engineering” (241–53) refl ect upon
the role of models in this fi eld. Th ey 
off er a refreshing look at the use of 
models in real-life situations which
contrasts with the occasionally 
sometimes stuff y theorizing present
in other chapters of the book. Th e
authors build on van Fraassen’s
typology of models, which consists
of data models, surface models and
theoretical models, but suggest en-
larging it with a  new category that
would account for the distinctly hu-
man purpose of some of the models.
In petroleum engineering, students
are typically exposed to physical,
mathematical (e.g. Darcy’s Law)17
and technological models (i.e. mod-
els of technological equipment),
roughly in that order. In this case,
model building doesn’t appeal only 
to epistemological needs but also
clearly to pragmatic ones – the max-
imum economic yield, of course, is
a  strong motivational force behind
most of these models – a force that
can also result in their distortions
and simplifi cations.
In conclusion, this volume
shows the widespread uses of 
models in contemporary science
and reveals their multifaceted na-
ture. As I remarked in the opening
paragraphs, the general availability 
of vast computational power makes
17  Darcy’s Law is an equation to compute the
ability of a fl uid to fl ow through a porous ma-
terial such as reservoir rock (permeability).
the proliferation of complex models 
in all scientifi c disciplines even 
more pronounced. At the same 
time, philosophers of science have 
been for decades attempting to 
establish a  solid base upon which 
the theory of models could be built, 
but up to now theoreticians remain 
embroiled in factious squabbles and 
a  common denominator is hard to 
fi nd. Perhaps then, what is true for 
models in science (if we use Cel-
lucci’s terminology), holds true as 
well for models of science – there is 
no optimal model of science and the 
search for one is futile. Th e answer 
to this puzzle could be quite sim-
ple if philosophers of science take 
heed of the advice Hersh gives to 
philosophers of mathematics: Th ere 
is a  number of possible approaches 
and if we look at them as models 
(both competitive and compli-
mentary at the same time) we can 
accept the fact that they can happily 
co-exist. Philosophers of science 
should embrace this diversity that 
naturally leaves room for alternative 
interpretations and should not try to 
win the game by imposing a  single 
dominating view.
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